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"This legal and moral legacy promised to change the world for the better, but
a good portion of that great promise has been only imperfectly realized."'
Introduction
The question of whether courts can incorporate international principles
into domestic law is deeply rooted in United States jurisprudence. Critics
of international law often claim that it lacks legitimacy as "law,' 2 while its
advocates argue that courts can freely incorporate it into the domestic legal
scheme. 3 This Note addresses the validity and possible implications of an
instance, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,4 where a United States court
used international law to fill a gap in domestic law.
The Grimes court faced the question of whether medical researchers
owe a duty of care to their subjects. With neither "federal or state statutes
that mandate that all research be subject to certain conditions,"5 nor a sta-
ble body of well settled case law, the court found itself without domestic
precedent. 6 On the international level and in the United States, there is
"virtually no enforcement of research rules" and thus no penalties for
researchers who violate rules and no compensation scheme for subjects
researchers violate. 7
1. Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
833, 833 (1990).
2. This criticism stems from types of mechanisms available for enforcing interna-
tional law. For a brief overview of the general enforcement mechanisms available in
international law, see, for example, Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., Enforcing International Law,
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. INSIGHTS,Jan. 1996, available at http://N'ww.asil.org/insights/insightl.
htm (noting the difficulty that some people have in conceptualizing law enforcement
without a conventional police force to back it).
3. See Harold Honju Koh, Review Essay, Why do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE kJ. 2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAIM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and
THOMAS FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAl LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995), and arguing
that they "represent the most comprehensive and sophisticated efforts to date" address-
ing the power of international law yet they still do not sufficiently account for transna-
tional legal processes). See genetally ABRAHM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY( AGREEMENTS (1995);
THOMAS FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
4. Grimes v. Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
5. See id.
6. A similar situation exists on an international level, where the practice of
medicine is governed by the laws of individual countries and international codes regu-
late human experimentation. See George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin, Where do we
go from Here?, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE (George Annas, et. al.
eds.) [hereinafter NAzi DOCTORS], at 307-14; Norman Howard-Jones, Human Experimen-
tation, in HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND MEDICAL
ETHICS 473 (Geneva: XVth CIOMS Council for International Organization of Medical
Sciences Round Table Conferences) (Z. Bankowski and N. Howard Jones, eds. 1982)
[hereinafter HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION].
7. Annas & Grodin, supra note 6, at 313.
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Thus, the Grimes court shook the research community,8 by finding
that a duty of care existed between researchers and their subjects. The
court looked to international law to help fill gaps in federal and state law
that the researchers interpreted as precluding a relationship between them-
selves and their subjects. The most immediate ramification of the Grimes
court's decision was its mandate that researchers rethink the ethical com-
ponents of their experiments. 9 Unlike other cases of experimentation that
have rocked the research community, the Grimes court's treatment of medi-
cal experimentation promises to provide a more lasting and useful frame-
work for handling future cases of experimentation.to
Despite existing literature focusing on the Nuremberg Code, I its pos-
sible use as domestic law has received nominal attention from both courts
and legal scholars. [2 This Note attempts to fill the gap. Section one pro-
vides information on the Grimes case. Section two explains the origins and
principles of the Nuremberg Code, focusing on the current problems in the
research setting that the Code can help remedy. Section three examines
the Code's place in domestic law and status as customary international
law. Section four demonstrates how the Nuremberg Code can be used in
cases brought against American researchers by international subjects.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Grimes court's use of the Nuremberg
Code-to fill gaps in domestic law in order to provide greater protection for
its citizens-was proper.
8. Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human
Subjects: Are we Really Ready to Fix a Broken System?, 26 LAW & PSYCHoL. REV. 1 (2002).
9. Id. at 1 (predicting the effect of the Grimes case on the research community).
10. For examples of some of the decisions that elicited shockwaves throughout the
research community, see In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.
Ohio 1995); PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FINAl REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD
Hoc PANEL TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1973) (examining
human experimentation by government doctors on African American men) [hereinafter
TUSKEGEE STUDY] ; JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1
(1993) (noting that 399 men who had disease were subjects in study); FINAL REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS (1995) (examining experi-
ments on patients involving injection of radiation into their bodies to monitor effects)
[hereinafter HUMAN RADIATION]. Despite the influence of these cases, they all settled,
precluding a full resolution of the issues therein.
I. See, e.g., Jay Katz, The Nuremberg Code and the Nuremberg Trial. A Reappraisal,
276 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1662 (1996); Ruth R. Faden et al., US Medical Researchers, the
Nuremberg Doctors Trial, and the Nuremberg Code: A Review of the Findings of the Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, 276 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1667 (1996);
Jon M. Harkness, Nuremberg and the Issue of Wartime Experiments on US Prisoners, 276
J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1672 (1996); Michael A. Grodin, Legacies of Nuremberg. Medical Eth-
ics and Human Rights, 276J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1682 (1996); Jonathan Turley, Transforma-
tive Justice and the Ethos of Nuremberg, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 665 (2000) (noting that
trials-such as the Nuremberg Trials-become forums for political or social conflicts left
unaddressed in the political system).
12. Larry I. Palmer, Disease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47
VILL. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (2002) (discussing the significance of whether courts characterize
the relationship between parties as being one between a doctor/patient or researcher/
subject in the "Human Genome Era").
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I. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute: Non-Therapeutic
Experimentation Without Knowing Consent' 3
In 1993 and 1994 respectively, Viola Hughes and Catina Higgins signed
consent forms that effectively enrolled their children, Erika Grimes and
Myron Higgins, in an experimental lead paint abatement study conducted
by the Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI). 14 The forms the women signed
apprised them of the possibility of lead poisoning in Baltimore homes,15
and offered them nominal compensation for their participation-five dol-
lars for answering questions and fifteen dollars for filling out question-
naires.' 6 Under its "Benefits" section,' 7 the consent form promised that
the researchers would provide the women with "blood-specific results" of
their children's lead levels, summaries of house test results, and steps that
the women could take to reduce their children's risk of lead exposure. t 8
The forms did not contain a section entitled "Risks," did not clearly dis-
close that the researchers' goal was to observe raised levels of lead in their
children's blood, 19 and did not state that the experiment would only suc-
13. Grimes v. Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (involving a suit by
research subjects against the researchers performing research upon them). Michael
Russel-Einhorn, former director of regulatory affairs in the NIH's office for Protection
from Research Risks called this case "one of the most significant of the decade." Gary
Young, Lead Paint Suit Breaks New Ground, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 3, 2001, at BI.
14. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 820. The purpose of the study was to find an economi-
cally efficient level of lead paint abatement, in order to encourage landlords to retain
low-income housing with "safe" levels of lead.
15. Id. at 824-25 (reprinting the consent form). The women's landlords were
required to disclose the presence of lead paint to the women anyway. See EPA, Protect
Your Family from Lead in Your Home, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/lead/outreach/leapame.pdf. In structures built prior to 1978, "landlords have to
disclose known information on lead-based paint and lead based paint hazards before
leases take effect. Leases must include a disclosure form about lead-based paint." Id.
For more information on the hazards of lead-based paint to children, see, for example;
CDC, What Every Parent Should Know about Lead Poisoning in Children, available at http:/
/www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/faq/cdc97a.htm; CDC, About Childhood Lead Poisoning, availa-
ble at http://ww".cdc.gov/nceh/lead/about/about.htm. For more specific commentary
about the effects of lead poisoning, see, for example, Children with Elevated Blood Lead
Levels Attributed to Home Renovation and Remodeling Activities- New York, 1993-1994 45
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1120 (Jan. 3, 1997), available at http://wwwX.cdc.
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00045033.htm; Blood Lead Levels in Young Children
United States and Selected States, 1996-1999, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1133 (Dec. 22, 2000), available at http://wwxv.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm
4950a3.htm.
16. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824-25.
17. "We would provide you with specific blood-lead results. We would contact you to
discuss a summary of house test results and steps that you could take to reduce any risks of
exposure." Id. at 825.
18. Id. For general information on lead paint disclosure requirements, see EPA Fact
Sheet, EPA and HUD Move to Protect Children from Lead-Based Paint Poisoning; Disclosure
of Lead-Based Paint Hazards in Housing, March 1996, available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/lead/1018/fs-discl.pdf; Protect Your Family from Lead in Your Home, supra note 15
(noting that the effects of lead include damage to the brain and nervous system, behav-
ioral and learning problems, slowed growth, hearing problems, headaches and that chil-
dren and young babies are at a higher risk because they are "more sensitive to the
damaging effects of lead).
19. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824-25.
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ceed if the children stayed in the homes long enough to enable the
researchers to observe noteworthy increases in the lead levels of their
blood. 20
Additionally, the forms the KK1 researchers presented to the women
did not reveal that their goal was to find a less than complete level of lead
paint abatement or that their experiment was a utilitarian project designed
to find an economically feasible way for Baltimore landlords with low cost
rental units to maintain them through partial abatements rather than aban-
don them due to prohibitive costs of full abatement. 2 1 After cooperating
with the researchers, the women discovered that they were not informed of
their children's raised lead levels and filed suits against the researchers. 22
The lower court dismissed the women's cases on summary judg-
ment,2 3 holding that a "special-relationship" did not exist between them
and the researchers. 24 However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal, finding that "the very nature of non-therapeutic scientific
research on human subjects can, and normally will, create special relation-
ships out of which duties arise. '"25 After this announcement, the Court
immediately launched into a discussion of the Nuremberg Code. 2 6
United States courts have had little opportunity to address cases
involving human experimentation. Within those cases few have survived
to produce a final binding judgment-making it difficult for courts to
20. For information on the risks that exposure to lead paint poses to children, see
sources cited supra notes 15, 18.
21. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 821.
22. Id.; Young, supra note t3.
23. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 818.
24. The special relationship referred to is a fiduciary relationship, like the one that
exists between a doctor and his or her patient. See id. at 825. Plaintiffs must establish
their cause of action in tort. The first step, which is often the hardest for experimenta-
tion subjects to meet, is the initial duty analysis. Unlike a case involving a doctor who
uses experimental treatments on his patient, there is not an inherent fiduciary duty that
binds a researcher to his subject. GeorgeJ. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal
and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & Po.'y
297 (1996) (arguing that current research protocol blurs the patient/subject distinc-
tion). It seems that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in Grimes recognized that the
proposed research was non-therapeutic in nature and thus suggested use of language in
the "informed consent" form that would make the research sound more therapeutic. See
Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812-13; see also Katharine 0. Adams, The Maryland Survey: 2000-
2001: Recent Decisions; X. Torts, 61 MD. L. REX'. 1043 (2002) (discussing the implication
of the Grimes case on tort law in Maryland, and concluding that although the case was
correctly decided, it failed to adequately instruct courts on how to handle similar cases
in the future); Beh, supra note 8
25. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835. For recent articles on the ramifications of the
court's decision, see Leonard H. Glantz, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Institute, AM. J. PUB. HiELTH, July 1, 2002; Gwendolyn Johnson, Grimes
v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc: The Court of Appeals of Maryland Distinguishes Special Rela-
tionships that may Arise to the Level of A Contractual Relationship between Researchers and
Non-therapeutic Research Participants, U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L (2001); Loretta M. Kopel, Pedi-
atric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows their InterpretationJ. L.
MED. & ETHICS (2002); Adams, supra note 24.
26. The Court uses the Nuremberg Code and Helsinki Declaration in addition to
United States regulations. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 849-50, 857-58, 861.
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develop a "common law" of human experimentation. 2 7 The court in
Grimes noted this lacuna in U.S. jurisprudence and turned to international
law because it could not uncover domestic law that created a duty between
researchers and their subjects. 28 Summarily precluding the possibility of
the researchers making utilitarian arguments, 29 the Grimes court drew
attention to the fact that "the Nuremberg Code, at least in significant part,
was the result of legal thought and legal principles, as opposed to medical
or scientific principles, and thus should be the preferred standard for
assessing the legality of scientific research on human subjects." 30
The Nuremberg Code's judicially crafted nature and the absence of
judicial precedent reinforced the Code's weight as the "most complete and
authoritative statement of the law of informed consent to human experi-
mentation." 3 1 The court blankly accepted the Code's applicability and
weight-calling it "part of international common law" that "may be applied,
in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and municipal courts in
the United States." 3 2 Basing its decision on the Nuremberg Code and the
protections offered by federal and state laws, the Grimes court found that
the researchers and the IRB at the Kennedy Krieger Institute had a partial
misperception of the difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research and of their own role in the process. 33
27. Many of these cases, particularly the more notorious ones, settle. Others are
dismissed on summary judgment or do not receive a full consideration of relevant
issues. See supra note 10, and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 814; see Kopel, supra note 25 (discussing the relationship between the
Grimes decision and 45 C.F.R. § 46); c.f Kendall Ann Dasaulniers, Legislation to Protect
the Decisionally Incapacitated Individual's Participation in Medical Research: Safety Net or
Trap Door?, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 179, 194-214 (2000-01) (discussing Maryland's failed
legislative attempts to implement its own regulations); see generally Adams, supra note
24.
This gap is striking considering that the United States is considered to have some of
the most extensive regulation concerning medical research in the world. Curran calls
U.S. regulations, "the most detailed provisions ever adopted in any country concerning
informed consent and documentation of consent" Williami. Curran, New Ethical-Review
Policy for Clinical Medical Research, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 952-54 (1988). However,
United States regulations are more lax concerning who can be subjects of research than
other nations. Further, despite these U.S. regulations, plaintiffs in cases involving medi-
cal research often find it difficult to survive summary judgment.
29. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 815-16.
30. See id. at 835.
31. Id. (citing George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United
States Courts, 7J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17, 19-21 (Spring, 1991) (citing in part
JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMEs 141; 1 Trials of War
Criminals Before Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 11-14
(1946-49) [hereinafter Trials II; 2 Trials of War Criminals Before Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181-82 (1946-49) [hereinafter Trials I1] ;
GEORGE ANNAS, et al., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S
DILEMMA 21 (1977)).
32. Id.
33. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 840. For an example of objections to the scheme of ethical
review boards, see Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1354, 1360 (1966).
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The court found several problems with the KKI researchers conduct.
First, the researchers previously published the results of a study that found
that lead-bearing dust is particularly hazardous for children. 34 Further the
researchers recruited landlords, who typically rented to low-income fami-
lies, and arranged for them to receive funds through government subsidies
or loans to perform the abatement.3 5 The landlords were then encouraged
or required to rent their units to families with small children. 36 Concern-
ing the researchers, the court noted that they "apparently saw nothing
wrong" with their intention to create lead accumulations in the blood of
healthy children or with their belief that the consent of the children's par-
ents made their research appropriate.
3 7
Similarly, the Grimes court found the KKI's IRB had a partial mis-
perception of the difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research and of its role in the process-because it was willing to aid
researchers in getting around federal regulations designed to protect chil-
dren used as subjects in non-therapeutic research. The minutes of the
IRB's meeting alone revealed that the IRB failed to protect potential the
researchers' subjects, when it suggested a change to the lead-paint abate-
ment experiment's proposed consent form:
The next issue has to do with drawing blood from the control popula-
tion, namely children growing up in modern urban housing. Federal guide-
lines are really quite specific regarding using children as controls in projects in
which there is no potential benefit [to the particular children]. To call a sub-
ject a normal control is to indicate that there is no real benefit to be
received [by the particular children]. So we think it would be much more
acceptable to indicate that the 'control group' is being studied to determine
what exposure outside the home may play in a total lead exposure; thereby,
indicating that these control individuals are gaining some benefit, namely
learning whether safe housing alone is sufficient to keep the blood-lead
levels in acceptable bounds. We suggest that you modify . . . consent
form[s] ... accordingly. 38
By finding a duty on the part of both the IRB and the researchers, the
Grimes court effectively opened the door to holding both groups accounta-
ble for unethical experimentation schemes.
34. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812.
35. Id. at 812, n. 15.
36. Id. The negative effects of lead on children are well-recognized. See generally
EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 18.
37. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813.
38. Grimes, 782 A.2d at n.45, 813-14 (reprinting the minutes of the meeting where
the IRB suggested this change in the consent form); see also Gwendolyn Johnson, Recent
Developments: Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 9 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 72, 77 (2001)
(noting that the Grimes court "aggressively" created Maryland law to protect innocent
children from potential harm by balancing the benefits of medical research for society
against the risks to individual lives); see generally, RobertJ. Katerberg, Note, Institutional
Review Boards, Research on Children, and Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tight-
rope Between Encouraging Vital Experimentation and Protecting Subjects' Rights, 24J.C. &
U.L. 545 (1998) (discussing specific instances of IRB abuses in the context of research
with children)
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1I. Origins and Principles of the Nuremberg Code
The Grimes case did not involve the typical elements39 that lead courts to
invoke international law-it involved purely domestic litigants, did not
involve any "contacts" outside of United States borders, 40 and no state
agency was directly involved in the litigation. 4' More remarkably, there are
domestic laws that cover human experimentation. 42 The Grimes court
unwittingly acknowledged that precedent did not fully support its reliance
on the Code when it noted that "certain international 'codes' or 'declara-
tions' exist (one of which is supposedly binding but has never been held as
such) that, at least in theory establish standards." 43 Further, the closest
the Grimes court came to looking at the Nuremberg Code's power in
domestic courts was by citing to an expert who claimed that the Code is
"part of the international common law and may be applied, in both civil
and criminal cases, by state, federal, and municipal courts in the United
States."4 4 The Court did not acknowledge that customary international
law is rarely cited and even more rarely applied, 4 5 nor did it address the
question of its own authority to do so as a state court. The reasoning in
Grimes thus lies on tenuous ground,46 particularly because the Court did
39. Aspects that are typically present when international law is applied include for-
eign parties, international contracts, diplomats, sovereigns and alleged violations of
international law. See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487 (Wis. App. 2003) (involv-
ing a foreign national who alleged violations of the Vienna Convention); Kerr v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 145 F.3d 580 (D.D.C. 2003) (involving issues of foreign sovereign
immunity).
Death sentence cases are one of the rare instances when domestic litigants evoke inter-
national law in cases involving domestic parties, however courts have consistently
refused to apply international law to avoid the death sentence. See, e.g., McGilberry v.
State, 843 So. 2d 21(Miss. 2003); Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can it be Fixed?,
51 CATH. U. L REV. 1177 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and Inter-
national Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485 (2002); Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger": The
Death Penalty and the Global lus Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEXAs L. REV. 1031
(2003).
40. Alien Torts Claim Act (ATCA) litigation provides a demonstration of foreign con-
tacts requirements. See, e.g., Papa v. U.S., 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002); Bano v. Union
Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001); Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
1996); Bagguley v. O'Donnell 953 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1991); De Arellano et. al., v. Wein-
berger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
41. Note that the government funded the subsidies that some landlords received to
perform the abatement procedures. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822.
42. Arguments for the application of international law in the form of customary
international law and treaties are often made by death row inmates. Courts have refused
these arguments, and have not defined death penalty prohibitions as customary interna-
tional law. See sources cited, supra note 39.
43. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814.
44. Id. at 835 (citing Annas, supra note 31, at 19-21 (1991)). George Annas cites
APPLEMAN, supra note 31, at 141.
45. See Jonathan Todres, Can Research Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Coun-
tries Sue Physician-Investigators for Human Rights Violations?, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS.
737, 750 (2000) (noting federal courts' reluctance, in the Alien Torts Claim Act setting,
to adopt customary international law).
46. This is due in part to the legal disposition of the case. The court needs only to
find a reason to deny summary judgment by finding a duty to inform on behalf of the
researchers. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 841-42; see also, Adams, supra note 24, at
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not address how the Nuremberg Code fits into domestic law. Accordingly,
analysis beyond the court's simple declaration that the Nuremberg Code is
binding as the law of nations is necessary. This Note aims to begin that
analysis.
As part of the larger body of Nuremberg Trials following World War II,
the "Medical Case,"'4 7 formulated "criteria [for human experimentation]
said to be widely accepted by the medical profession"-the Nuremberg
Code.48 Officially known as The United States v. Karl Brandt, the findings
in the Medical Case were not considered innovative even though-prior to
the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code as part of the findings in that
case-Germany was one of the only countries that regulated experimenta-
tion on humans. The Medical Case itself prompted the promulgation of the
first codes on medical experimentation in the United States.4 9
The Nuremberg Code's most basic principle is voluntary consent, its
"critical masterpiece." 50 The Nuremberg Code postulates that "voluntary
consent" is the sine qua non for experiments on human subjects 5' and
requires that consent, at minimum, be competent, voluntary, informed,
and comprehending. 52  Protecting human subjects is the Nuremberg
Code's paramount concern, and in that vein, it regulates research settings,
investigator integrity, balancing of risks and benefits and unique problems
1065-66, 1073 (concluding that while the Grimes court's decision was correct, its anal-
ysis was incomplete and that the court failed to prove adequate support for its holding
that special relationship involving duties may arise between a researcher and his
subjects),
47. United States v. Karl Brandt, Trials I, supra note 31 (sections reprinted in NAZI
DOCTORS, supra note 6). This note is concerned with counts two and three of the indict-
ment. See id. at 97. The case tried twenty-three Nazi doctors on four charges: (1) com-
mon design or conspiracy; (2) war crimes; (3) crimes against humanity; and (4)
membership in a criminal organization. The charges conflate the charges for war crimes
and crimes against humanity by listing them together. See Judgment and Aftermath, in
NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 6 at 94-104 [reprinting documents from the Trial]. For a first
hand narration of Nazi doctors' experimentation with human subjects, see Eva Mozes-
Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experimentation: A personal Account, in NAZI Doctors
supra note 6 at 53-59. For more information on Mengele's experiments, see Annas,
supra note 31.
48. See Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at Nurem-
berg, 22 YAILE J. INT'L L. 401, 417 (1997).
49. The fact that the U.S. did not have guidelines regulating experimentation was a
contested issue at the trial. It has also lead commentators to suggest that the Nuremberg
Code did not reflect the current state of law at the time it was issued. See Trials 1, supra
note 31 at 8-10 (sections reprinted in NAZi DOCTORS, supra note 6); Michael A. Grodin,
Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 6, at 121, 122-23.
50. See Grodin, supra note 49, at 121, 122-23.
51. This term has been replaced because it regarded as being redundant. See gener-
ally, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 6. For an exposition of the different roles
informed consent should play in medical treatment and human experimentation, see
Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL
MED. 157 (1998) (arguing that failing to recognize that subjects who volunteer for sake
of advancement of science are differently situated from patients who stand to benefit
from treatment results in analysis that misconceives purpose of disclosure).
52. See ANNAS ET. AL., supra note 31, at 7. It is noteworthy that the Code makes no
exceptions for full disclosure and that the element of comprehension required differs in
the therapeutic and experimental settings. Id.
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of vulnerable populations.5 3 Further the Code's first principle states that
each individual who initiates research experimentation is responsible for
that research and that he may not delegate that responsibility with
impunity.5 4
The Nuremberg Code is the "hallmark for all subsequent discourse on
the ethics of human experimentation. ' 55 But, due to its judicially crafted
nature the Code has persuasive legal status but is not legally binding.
Although it influenced the formation of other international documents
concerning medical experimentation, such as the Helsinki Declaration and
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS), 56 the protections it offers were considered "a good code for
barbarians but an unnecessary code for ordinary physician-scientists.
5 7
Many current federal regulations find their basis in the Nuremberg Code. 58
However, even though the courts in the United States have used the Nurem-
berg Code to set criminal and civil standards of conduct, none have used it
in a criminal case and only a handful have cited it in the civil context.
5 9
There is little judicial precedent concerning human experimenta-
tion,60 however, the accelerated mode of current scientific and medical
breakthroughs promises to bring new cases to court. Before engaging in an
analysis of why the Nuremberg Code is a useful framework for experimen-
tation on human subjects, it is necessary to understand the nature of the
protections it provides.
53. See Grodin, supra note 49, at 121, 122-23; ANNAS ET. AL., supra note, 31 at 139.
54. Nuremberg Code, see infra at app.
55. See ANNAS ET. AL., supra note 31, at 139.
56. See Todres, supra note 45, at 750. For the text of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), see THE INTERNATIONAl BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Paul Williams,
ed. 1981). For a discussion on the legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, see Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INTIL & CONTEMP. L. 1 (1995/1996).
57. Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and
Now, in NAzi DOCTORS supra note 6, at 227, 228.
58. See, e.g., Roberta Kalechofsky, Human Experimentations: Before the Nazi Era and
After, available at http://www.micahbooks.com/readingroom/humanexperimentation.
html. For a chronology of experimentation on humans, see Vera Hassner Sharav,
Human Experiments: A Chronology of Human Research, available at http://www.research
protection.org/history/chronology.html (website of the Alliance for Human Research
Protection).
59. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835.
60. Searches on legal databases such as LEXIS produced only two cases using the
term "non-therapeutic experimentation." It only uncovered thirteen cases that mention
the Nuremberg Code: Grimes, 782 A.2d 807; O'Neil v. Secretary of Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d
641 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Heinrich ex rel. Henrich v. Sweet, 62 F.Supp. 2d 282 (D. Mass.
1999); Heinrich ex rel. Henrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp.2d 27 (D.Mass. 1999); White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation,
874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,(1987); Whitlock v.
Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. N.C. 1986); Hinkie v. U.S., 715 F.2d 96 (3d
Cir. 1983); Wentsel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244 (Md. 1982);
Jaffee v. U.S., 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505
(NJ. 1980); In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. 1974).
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A. The Blurred Perception of Doctor-Patient/Researcher-Subject
Relationships
There is an often blurred distinction between doctor-patient/researcher-
subject relationships. 6 1 Doctors have legal obligations or fiduciary duties
to disclose information to their patients.6 2 Researchers have no similar
legal duties. 63 In the United States, federal regulations cover the
researcher-subject relationship, but do not create a direct legal duty
between researchers and their subjects. 64 Rather, federal regulations make
IRBs 6 5 liable for the regulation of the subject-researcher relationship. 6 6
61. George Annas argues that "[i]n less than half a century, human experimentation
has been transformed from a suspect activity into a presumptively beneficial activity.
With this transformation, traditional distinctions between experimentation and therapy,
subject and patient, and researcher and physician have become discouragingly blurred."
George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation Nuremberg, Hel-
sinki, and Beyond, 2 HiALTH MATRIX 119, 119-20 (1992).
62. See generally Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is
Right" to "Patient Has Rights, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1260 (2000) (concluding that
there was an enormous expansion in the rights of patients to know more about their
medical treatment within the last fifty years and that the American public favors this
development).
63. See Palmer, supra note 12, at 24-28 (discussing doctors' duties and arguing that
researchers should have similar duties to disclose information to their research
subjects).
64. See Glantz, supra note 25; see also Kopel, supra note 25, at 40-46 (discussing the
Grimes holding in relation to existing federal guidelines).
65. IRBs are oversight entities. In research experiments, an IRB can be required by
either federal or state regulation, or sometimes by the conditions attached to govern-
mental grants used to fund research projects. Their primary functions are to assess the
protocols of the project to determine whether the project is appropriate, the consent
procedures are adequate, the methods to be employed meet proper standards, reporting
requirements are sufficient, as well as the assessment of various other aspects of a
research project. One of their most important objectives is the review of the potential
safety and the health hazard impact of a research project on the human subjects of the
experiment, especially on vulnerable subjects such as children. Their function is not to
help researchers seek funding for research projects. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813; Beh,
supra note 8 (discussing IRBs in relation to the Grimes case); Katerberg, supra note 38, at
577-79 (concluding that "the bottom line, and the general consensus . . . is that the
federal regulations are flexible and leave a great deal of discretion in the hands of local
IRBs on how to handle informed consent for research on children subjects.").
IRBs have been highly criticized. See Mary R. Anderlik and Nanette Elster, Ethics Com-
mentary, Court Decisions and Advertisements, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 220 (2001); D.
Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A Proposal for Heightened
Safeguards, J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 479, 481-96 (1999) (critiquing IRBs while
discussing federal regulation of research involving human subjects with focus on vulner-
able populations); Kerry Burke, Note, Loose-Fitting Genes: The Inadequacies in Federal
Regulation of Institutional Review Boards, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 10, 12-47 (1997)
(discussing problems with IRBs in context of breast cancer); c.f. National Institutes of
Health, Bioethics Resources on the Web: Human Subjects Research and IRBs (describing
function and operation of Institutional Review Board), at http://vww.nih.gov/sigs/bio
ethics/IRB.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
66. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2001) (requiring that IRB review and approve all
research activities covered by Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects); see
also I. Glenn Cohen, Administrative Developments: New Human Subject Research Guide-
lines for IRBs, 28 J. L. MED & ETHICS 305 (2000); (discussing new guidelines and the
problems the), are designed to fix).
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This is one reason why the Hippocratic Oath-which only applies to doc-
tors in their capacity as such-is inapplicable as an ethical restriction on
researchers. 67
The absence of a duty that runs directly between researchers and their
subjects is disquieting for a number of reasons. First, the fact that a person
can be both a doctor and a researcher and act in those capacities separately
blurs the doctor/ researcher distinction. This can occur, for example,
when the doctor of a terminally ill patient begins to try novel treatments,
when he considers his patient has "nothing to lose"-a doctor can thus
unwittingly shift between a doctor and a researcher. 68 In this context, the
doctor/researcher can also shift between providing therapeutic and non-
therapeutic care.
This is particularly problematic because courts do not usually recog-
nize the difficulty that lay people have in distinguishing between a doctor
and a researcher or the social conditioning that people have about prospec-
tive research experimentation as being capable of yielding results that will
help the "higher good." Even people who knowingly consent to be research
subjects, like people entering into contracts, are most likely overly optimis-
tic about both the amount of harm they are subjecting themselves to and
about the prospective of beneficial results the study might yield. 69 The
Grimes court noted that whether or not a duty exists is a factual inquiry,
but that in most cases one would be present.
B. The Unwitting Self-Interest of Researchers and IRBs
While researchers work to find cures for diseases, social harms and like
maladies, they often unwittingly lose sight of their subject's best inter-
ests.70 The term "subject" itself connotes an impersonal subrogation of the
person who agrees to participate in the experimentation. 7 1 Researchers
67. The primary thrust of the Hippocratic Oath is the obligation to benefit the
patient. A problem arises here when the "subject" of experiment is not a "patient."
Grodin notes, "Alexander and Ivy confused therapeutic treatment of patients with non-
therapeutic experimentation on prisoners .... " Grodin, supra note 49. For a discussion
of this problem in a contemporary context, see Palmer, supra note 12 at 34 (discussing
the significance of whether courts characterize the relationship as between a doctor/
patient or researcher/subject in the "Human Genome Era.").
68. See Annas, supra note 62.
69. Gelsinger v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Phila. Cnty. Ct. of C.P.,
filed September 18, 2000), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.
html; see also Maureen Milford, Lawsuit Attack Medical Trials as Claims Arise, Some Fear
Test Will Lose Public Support, 23 NAT'L I.J. (Aug. 27, 2001) (discussing the onslaught of
lawsuits concerning medical research subjects).
70. See Annas, supra note 61, at 137-140 (noting that the terminally ill are espe-
cially vulnerable to exploitation by researchers who are often unrealistically optimistic
in their expectations and believe that their subjects cannot be harmed); Gelsinger, supra
note 69.
71. The dictionary defines "subject" as: one that is placed under authority or con-
trol: as a vassel (1) one subject to a monarch and governed by the monarch's law (2) :
one who lives in the territory of, enjoys the protection of, and owes allegiance to a sover-
eign power or state. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1425-26 (4th ed. 1999). See also, Kurtz,
supra note 62, at n.45 (noting in the context of physician-patient relationship that
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have a clear interest in downplaying the possible risks and over-inflating
the possible benefits of experimentation, thus they can assume "Jekyll and
Hyde" like characteristics. 7 2 In Grimes, the court noted that the research-
ers at KKI, "apparently saw nothing wrong" with the fact that they intended
to create lead accumulations in the blood of healthy children. 73
Application of the Nuremberg Code creates a direct duty between the
researcher and his subject, and thus can be tapped to establish a duty or
standard of care applicable to all medical experimenters. 74 Doctors might
have good reasons not to completely disclose the details of procedures or
treatment, such as not discouraging the patient from undergoing necessary
treatment. But similar arguments cannot be made in the context of the
non-therapeutic experimentation that was present in Grimes.7 5
C. The Difficulty of Distinguishing Between Therapeutic/Non-
therapeutic
The "therapeutic/non-therapeutic" distinction also opens possibilities for
deception because it encourages IRBS and researchers to cast their experi-
ments as beneficial in some way because subjects are less likely to partici-
pate in research which will harm or not benefit them. 76 The Grimes court
found that the IRB at the Kennedy Krieger Institute had a partial mis-
perception of the difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research and of its own role in the process. 77 Neither the researchers nor
the IRB voiced ethical concerns about their purposed research project. The
IRB itself suggested an alteration of the language of the consent form to,
"miscast the characteristics of the study in order to avoid the responsibility
informed consent contributes to the quality of medical care because patients do between
when they are part of the process rather than mere objects of it).
72. Annas, supra note 24, at 268; see Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and
Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REV. 205, 219 (1996) (noting that researchers, however
well-intentioned have motives that may differ from or be contrary to their subjects); see
also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 151 (1984) (noting that "all
kinds of senseless interventions are tried in a conscious effort to cure the incurable
magically through a 'wonder drug,' a novel surgical procedure, or a penetrating psycho-
logical interpretation")
73. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813. These same researchers previously published the
results of a study that found that lead-bearing dust is particularly hazardous for chil-
dren. Id. at 812.
74. ANNAS, ET. AL, supra note 3152, at 8-9.
75. It must be conceded that while the children in the KKI research studies had
raised levels of lead in their blood, their situation is not unique and occurs outside the
realm of experimental research. Lead-based paint poisoning in children has prompted
much alarm. See, e.g., Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pen-
sions Subcommittee on Public Health, Nov. 15, 1999 (testimony of Richard J. Jackson),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/washington/testimony/chl11599.htm; Alliance to End
Childhood Lead Poisoning, Global Dimensions of Lead Poisoning First International Pre-
vention Conference Final Report, May 20, 1994) available at http://www.globalleadnet.
org/pdf/ifpcFULL.pdft
76. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 812. For a discussion of the difficulty of determining
whether treatments are research or therapy in the context of cancer and AIDS, see
Annas, supra note 61, at 128-36
77. Id at 840.
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inherent in non-therapeutic research. 78
The Kennedy Krieger Institute is a sophisticated and reputable
research facility. If the IRB at KKI does not understand the distinction
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic experimentation or is con-
sciously willing to stretch the language in consent forms to make clearly
non-therapeutic research sound beneficial, 79 then one can only wonder at
the misunderstandings or stretching of language and circumstance that
might occur at less sophisticated research institutions.
Another common and related miscomprehension in both research and
medical settings is that "informed consent" is present if a consent form was
signed.80 The term "informed consent," however, connotes more than a
signature-it is supposed to memorialize an autonomous decision to par-
ticipate made with full knowledge of the potential risks involved in partici-
pating. However, informed consent forms are often nominalized and
"viewed as a chore and a ritual, an impersonal incantation, a hurried sign-
ing of papers.""'
Courts also make this mistake by failing to distinguish between what
types of consent should be required in the research and treatment set-
78. Id. at 813-14. The Grimes court reprints the minutes of the meeting where the
IRB suggested this change in the consent form:
The next issue has to do with drawing blood from the control population, namely
children growing up in modern urban housing. Federal guidelines are really quite specific
regarding using children as controls in projects in which there is no potential benefit [to the
particular children]. To call a subject a normal control is to indicate that there is no real
benefit to be received [by the particular children] ... So we think it would be much more
acceptable to indicate that the 'control group' is being studied to determine what expo-
sure outside the home may play in a total lead exposure; thereby, indicating that these
control individuals are gaining some benefit, namely learning whether safe housing
alone is sufficient to keep the blood-lead levels in acceptable bounds. We suggest that
you modify . . .consent form[s] ...accordingly.
79. The Grimes Court found that, while the suggestion of the IRB would not make
this experiment any less non-therapeutic or, less regulated, this statement evidenced two
things: (1) that the IRB had a partial misperception of the difference between therapeutic
and non-therapeutic research and the IRB's role in the process and (2) that the IRB was
willing to aid researchers in getting around federal regulations designed to protect chil-
dren used as subjects in non-therapeutic research. An IRB's primary role is to assure the
safety of human research subjects-not help researchers avoid safety or health-related
requirements. The IRB, in this case, misconceived, at least partially, its own role. Id at
814. For an exposition on research with children, see generally Leonard H. Glantz,
Research with Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED 213 (concluding that better and clearer rules
are needed to protect both children and the integrity of research endeavors).
80. Annas & Grodin, supra note 6, at 308 (arguing that the Nuremberg Code's
response "is to prohibit the objectification of the subject by requiring the subject's volun-
tary, competent, informed and understanding consent"). Even physicians are aware of
the fact that they can capitalize on their patients' inability to understand informed con-
sent, thus physicians can "comply with the law by making required disclosures which
they believe patients do not understand." Kurtz, supra note 62; see Cathy J.jones, Auton-
omy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-fulfilling Proph-
ecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 430 (1990).
81. Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the
Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455-512 (1996).
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tings.8 2 In her article focusing on the differences between research-subject
and doctor-patient relationships, Karine Morin argues:
Only a distinct and strict rule on full disclosure can protect the princi-
ple of autonomy of human research subjects by making clear that they do
not place their trust in physicians to regain their health, but rather that
they rely on scientific experiment to yield valuable knowledge to make
their participation meaningful.8 3
In other words, research subjects' interests are clearly not protected by
less than full disclosure of all the risks and possibilities of danger and
benefit.
The Nuremberg Code helps subvert problems inherent with informed
consent because it can work in concert with federal regulations by not
interfering with the particular format of informed consent while maintain-
ing special protections that both federal and other international regula-
tions lack. No other body of regulation or code provides a stricter rule of
voluntary consent. In the United States, the closest federal regulations
come to the Code's protections are in the areas of fetal and prisoner
research.84
D. The Questionable Demographics of Medical Research
In the United States the catalogue of human experimentation rests prima-
rily in poor populations. The infamous Cincinnati Radiation Litigation,
Jewish Hospital Disease Case and Tuskegee Syphilis study8 5 all involved indi-
gent and often minority subjects who were unaware of their status as
research subjects. Researchers notoriously seek low income minorities or
children as subjects.8 6 This was also the case in Grimes,8 7 where even the
remuneration listed under the "Benefits" section of the consent form was
82. Palmer, supra note 12, at 24-28 (arguing that the amount of required disclosure
is greater in the research context). The treatment/research setting is not coterminous to
therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction.
83. See Morin, supra note 51, at 221.
84. See Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and
Regulations, in NxI DOCTORS, supra note 6, at 183, 198.
85. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995);
TuSKEGEE STUDY, supra note 10; JONES, supra note 10 (noting that 399 men who had
disease were subjects in study); HUMAN RADIATION, supra note 10) (examining experi-
ments on patients involving injection of radiation into their bodies to monitor effects).
86. See Janet Fleetwood, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Advocating for
Patient-Subjects, 8 WIDENER L. SyroP. J. 105 (2001); see generally, Ryan, infra note 89
(noting that abuses of clinical trial subjects, particularly children, has plagued human
research). The first tests of immunization were preformed on slaves and children, for
further explanation and examples, see Glantz, supra note 79, at 215-18. For a descrip-
tive analysis on why children are particularly vulnerable research subjects, see id. at
218-44 (noting that among other problems "desperate parents of terminally ill children
may be unable to protect their children in the research circumstance" Id. at 244)
87. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 822; see William J. Curran, Subject Consent Require-
ients, in CLINICAL RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FOR INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOP-
INC COUNTRIES IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND MEDICAL ETHICS, 35-79.
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targeted towards low income families.88 Proposed "benefits" included
$5.00 for answering questions and allowing the researcher to sketch the
home, and $15 for completing each questionnaire.8 9 The researchers fur-
ther planned to compensate the participants with gifts, coupons for leisure
activities, and "on going incentives" like food coupons in exchange for col-
lecting the children's blood.90 Even if the families were not in need, the
small rather than large amount of remuneration might cause any person to
assume that the research she is participating in is not dangerous-as she
would surely expect hefty remuneration for participating in potentially
hazardous experimentation or exposing her children to harm. 9 1
1lI. The Nuremberg Code's Place in Domestic Law
A. Opposition to Treating the Nuremberg Code as Law in the
United States
As early as 1952, Department of Defense lawyers spoke of the Nuremberg
Code as an international sanction.9 2 Although Pentagon lawyers recog-
nized the Nuremberg Code as law, researchers at Harvard University, lead
by Dr. Henry Beecher, claimed the Nuremberg Code was a "legalistic docu-
ment" that did not apply to researchers. 9 3  Dr. Beecher successfully
88. For an application of this principle to children in the context of lead-based paint
poisoning, see CDC, Recommendations for Blood Lead Screening of Young Children
Enrolled in Medicaid: Targeting a Group at High Risk, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. I (Feb. 2000) (finding that children aged 1-5 years enrolled in Medicaid are at
increased risk for having elevated blood lead levels (BLLs)) available at http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4914a 1.htm.
89. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 824. Another research experiment that took place in
New York City involved children between the ages of six and ten who were forced to fast
for eighteen-hour periods and had blood drawn from catheters. These children were
exposed to doses of the diet drug fenflouramine to help measure a hormone to their
brains that may be linked to anti-social behavior. The children were offered $25 gift
certificates to a popular toy store and their parents revived $100 for giving their permis-
sion for their children's participation. Ann E. Ryan, Comment, Protecting the Rights of
Pediatric Research Subjects in the International Conference on Harmonization of the Techni-
cal Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 848, 848 (2000).
90. Grimes, 782 A.2d at n. 34.
91. For generally known information on the effects of lead on health, see sources
cited, supra note 18.
92. See Morris L. Hawk, Comment, The "Kingdom of Ends": In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 977, 995-97 (1995).
93. SeeJon Harkness, et al., Laying Ethical Foundations for Clinical Research, 79 BuL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 365, 365 (2001).The problem here is likely exaggerated by the fact
that the Medical Case itself did not treat counts two and three of the indictment-war
crimes and crimes against humanity-separately.
The counts are identical in content, except for the fact that in count two the acts
which are made the basis of the charges are alleged to be committed on 'civilian
and members of the armed forces [of nations] then at War with the German
Reich ... in the exercise of belligerent control,' whereas in count three the crimi-
nal acts are alleged to have been committed against German civilians and
nationals of other countries ... With this distinction observed, both counts will
be treated as one and discussed together.
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requested that the Nuremberg Code be subverted for his research. 9 4
Researchers such as Dr. Beecher rejected the Nuremberg Code because
they concluded that it was extreme and applied only to heinous "Nazi-like"
crimes.9 5 Further they argued that the Code is context specific and meant
to apply only to the experiments performed in concentrations camps.
However, despite their rejection of the Nuremberg Code, Dr. Beecher
and his colleagues did not reject the doctrine of informed consent that the
Code first espoused. Although Dr. Beecher recognized the difficulty of
obtaining informed consent, he found that it is "absolutely essential to
strive for it for moral, sociological, and legal reasons. '9 6 Opponents of the
Nuremberg Code argue that the Hippocratic Oath is sufficient to assure
ethical behavior and that the absolute requirement of consent is inapplica-
ble to populations, including children, upon whom important medical
research has traditionally been performed. 9 7 Thus, although researchers
in Dr. Beecher's camp chose to take a limited view of the Medical Case, they
strongly espoused the ethical principle at the heart of the Nuremberg
Code-informed consent. 98 Other commentators argue that the Nurem-
berg Code does not adequately provide for research in emergency situa-
tions;99 because it requires the subject's consent in all circumstances. An
understanding of the distinction between the treatment and research set-
ting proves that this concern is unwarranted. 100
B. Support for Treating the Nuremberg Code as the law in the
United States
Scholars assert that egregious human experiments in the United States,
such as the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male and
the Human Radiation experiments "seem to scream out for an application
of the Nuremberg Code."' ° t Experts on medical experimentation further
Judgment and Aftermath, supra note 47, at 97. Researchers around the world might have
been more apt to heed the Code had the count for war crimes been separated from the
one for crimes against humanity. See Palmer, supra note 12, at 28-31.
94. Dr. Andrew Ivy was a witness from the AMA who testified against the Nazi doc-
tors. Ironically, many commentators argue that he performed experiments very similar
to those that the Nazi doctors performed.
95. See Harkness et al., supra note 93, at 365.
96. See Beecher, supra note 33 at 1360.
97. See Jonathan D. Moreno, Reassessing the Influence of the Nuremberg Code on
American Medical Ethics, J. CONTEMP. H. L. & PoL' 347, 349 (1997).
98. See Beecher, supra note 33 at 1360; Harkness et al., supra note 93, at 365-66.
99. "Contrary to the first principle of the Nuremberg Code, the voluntary consent of
the human subjects is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethically and legally responsi-
ble research in the United States." Norman Frost, Waived Consent for Emergency
Research, 24 AM. J. L. AND MED. 163 (1998). But see Grimes, 782 A.2d 807; White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. See generally, Palmer, supra note 12 at 24.
101. For this assertion as well as descriptions of these miscast experiments, see id. at
28-29; Larry |. Palmer, The Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 MD. L. REv. 604,
604-18 (1997) (analyzing legacy of Tuskegee Study). See generally TUSKEGEE STUDY,
supra note 10; (examining human experimentation by government doctors on African
American men); HUMAN RADIATION, supra note 10.
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argue that since the United States had a preeminent role in the Code's pro-
mulgation as well as in the adjudication of the Medical Case, that "[i]f there
is any country that should feel itself bound by the legal precepts of the
Nuremberg Code, it is the United States."' 1 2 However, there are few prece-
dents for the Nuremberg Code's application and those that do exist often
do not set meaningful precedence.1 0 3 For example, both the Tuskegee and
Radiation experiments were settled without full adjudication and involved
government agencies rather than private individuals.
10 4
As noted above, when it was issued, the Nuremberg Code flourished in
the national security department. 105 Its influence there persists; for exam-
ple before Desert Storm special legislation was sought to subvert any neces-
sary obligations that the Code may have created. 10 6 In contrast, the
Nuremberg Code's influence was practically imperceptible in both the
medical and judicial spheres until 1973.107 This can partially be
explained by the fact that United States courts do not typically face cases
concerning medical experimentation. Beginning in 1973, an evolution
occurred in the judicial recognition of the Code and has evolved to the
point that now, when faced with cases of human experimentation, judges
in the United States routinely refer to the Nuremberg Code: 10 8
102. See George Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Verses Expediency,
in NAzI DOCTORS, supra note 6, at 201.
103. Many of these cases deal with military personnel who are treated under particu-
lar legal rules, or are settled before being fully adjudicated. See, e.g., Jaffee v. U.S., 663
F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); O'Neil v. Secretary of
Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d 641 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
104. See Palmer, supra note 12, at 29.
105. See Moreno, supra note 976 at 350. Moreno bases his argument on the Final
Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments,
released by President Clinton on Oct. 3, 1995. Moreno was a committee member. See
HUMAN RADIATION, supra note 10. After the Nuremberg judgment the Secretary of
Defense issued a directive requiring that human experimentation under the Depart-
ments auspices proceed only under the dictates of the Code. See Hawk, supra note 91, at
995-97.
106. The FDA granted the Department of Defense immunity from Nuremberg Code
requirements, thus politically sanctioning its direct violation. See DEPARTMFNTS OF
DEFENSE REQUEST IOR EXEMPTION FROM INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATION
DESERT SHIiELD AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE (Dec. 18, 19990), reprinted
in,judgment and Aftermath, supra note 47, at 94; Annas, supra note 3147 at 17; GeorgeJ.
Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Medical Ethics and Human Rights: Legacies oj Nuremberg, 3
HOESTRA L. & Poi'Y SYMP. 111, 120 (1999) (citing examples of experiments for govern-
mental purposes-including U.S. military and cold war radiation experiments and the
use of investigational drugs on U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War without their consent-that
directly violated the Nuremberg Code); see also William Gorge Eckhart, Essay, Nurem-
berg-Fifty Years: Accountability and Responsibility, 65 UMKC L. REV. 1, 12 (commenting
that the accountability and responsibility required by the Nuremberg Principles are
being emphasized through a "surprising source" -military doctrine)
107. The first court case to invoke the Code was in 1973. See Moreno, supra note
9697, at 350.
108. See Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986); TUSKFGEE
SrUDY, supra note 10; HUMAN RADIATION, supra note 10; Gelsinger, supra note 68, availa-
ble at http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html.
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[T]he Code was first seen as obviously applying to the imprisoned and the
oppressed persons, then to all healthy subjects, then to those who were sick
but would not benefit from an experiment, and then finally to those who
were sick but stood a chance of benefiting from the research participation.
In fact, it was not logic that was operative in this evolution, but a growth in
moral perception.' 0
9
This evolution in moral perception has resulted in the emergence of a
sense of legal obligation to at least mention, if not give legal weight to, the
Nuremberg Code.
Strong support for the Nuremberg Code's application lies in Justice
O'Connor's dissent in U.S. v. Stanley, the only case the Supreme Court has
addressed involving human experimentation.1 [0 In Stanley, the Supreme
Court denied recovery to a military officer who claimed that he was
secretly administered LSD as a part of a military experiment. The major-
ity's rejection of the Nuremberg Code was due to the combination of the
Veteran Benefits Act and the "special needs" of the United States military,
rather than a rejection of the Code's principles. t ' Justice O'Connor's dis-
senting opinion in Stanley' 1 2 rejected the majority's proposition that ser-
vice in the military creates an exemption from the individual protections
provided by the Nuremberg Code." 1 3 Justice O'Connor argued that:
No judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and
unknowing human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case.
Indeed, as Justice Brennan observes, the United States military played an
instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experi-
mented with human subjects during the Second World War, and the stan-
dards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the
behavior of the defendants stated that the "voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential ... to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts."
If this principle is violated the very least that society can do is to see that the
victims are compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators. I am pre-
pared to say that our Constitution's promise of due process of law guaran-
tees this much. 14
109. See Moreno, supra note 96 at 358.
110. See U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
111. Compare White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, n. 2 (E.D. Wash. 1998). The
White court worked hard to differentiate its case from Stanley, by arguing that the case
did not involve "straightforward non-consensual experimentation." However, Stanley
did not involve straightforward non-consensual experimentation, because the Plaintiffs
consent was given when he joined the armed services and not for the specific experi-
ment to which he was subjected. For a brief discussion of the factal situation in Stanley,
see Kevin M. King, Note, A Proposalfor the Effective International Regulation of Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, STAN. J. INT'L L. 163, 163-65 (1998) (noting that
Master Sergeant Stanley's situation was not unique).
Several cases citing the Nuremberg Code involve experimentation with military per-
sonnel. See, e.g., Jaffee v. U.S., 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981); O'Neil v. Secretary of
Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d 641 (W.D. Pa. 1999); see also Annas & Grodin, supra note 6 at
312-13 (complaining about the failure of courts to provide recovery for violated plain-
tiffs or to punish their violators).
112. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669.
113. See Hawk, supra note 91, at 989.
114. See Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor found support for the first edict of the Code in the
U.S. Constitution, thus placing it higher in the hierarchy of laws than it
would have if she had given it status as customary international law.'
1 5
This is strong support for the proposition that the Nuremberg Code had
legal force in the United States prior to the Grimes court's reliance on it.
Absent the special circumstances created by military exemptions present
in Stanley,' 16 Justice O'Connor's invocation of the Nuremberg Code should
be persuasive.
Following Justice O'Connor's argument, the In Re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation' 17 court suggested that because the Medical Case was tried by
American judges, constitutional due process standards must have played
an implicit role in the Nuremberg Code's promulgation.'"" Further, in Cin-
cinnati Radiation Litigation,1 19 the court found that "even were the Nurem-
berg Code not afforded precedential weight in the courts of the United
States, it cannot be readily dismissed from its proper context in this
case."1 20 Along with the adoption by the Department of Defense and the
National Institutes of Health, the court found at least three bases for its
invocation of the Code, 1 2 ' and declared that the Nuremberg Code is "part
of the law of humanity."1
22
C. The Nuremberg Code's Status as Customary International Law'
23
It remains puzzling that commentators have not focused on the Nuremberg
Code's status as international law. The Grimes court asserts that it is "part
of international common law and may be applied, in both civil and crimi-
nal cases, by state, federal and municipal courts in the United States."1
2 4
However, the court simply cites a legal scholar to support this statement
and that legal scholar's assertion leads only to another legal scholar's work
that assumes the Nuremberg Code's status as customary international
law. 125 Similarly, although scholars often assert the Nuremberg Code's
applicability as customary international law, they rarely support their anal-
ysis, and typically cite to a source discussing customary international law
generally rather than performing a thorough evaluation of (1) whether the
115. See Id.
116. See id.; Hinkie v. United States of America 715 F. 2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (dis-
missing on summary judgment the claims of a serviceman's widow who claimed that
her one son's death and her other son's birth defects were caused by radiation experi-
ments that her husband was unknowingly exposed to during his active duty in the
Army); O'Neil v. Secretary of Navy, 76 F. Supp. 2d 641 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Jaffee v. U.S.,
663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981).
117. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
118. See Hawk, supra note 91, at 989.
119. See Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796.
120. See id. at 821.
121. See Hawk, supra note 91, at 989-91.
122. See Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. at 821.
123. For an elaboration of the what constitutes customary international law, see
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1996).
124. See Grimes, 782 A.2d 807.
125. See id. at 835 (citing Annas, supra note 31, at 19-21 (citing in part APiEMAN,
supra note 31 at 141)); Trials I supra note 31, at 14.
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Code is customary international law, and; (2) if so, how the Code can be
used as law in domestic courts.126 Courts that cite the Nuremberg Code
similarly fail to deal explicitly with the essential issue of whether the
Nuremberg Code's requirement of informed consent is part of the domes-
tic law of the United States.1 2 7 This Section sets out to answer that
question.
Perhaps, one reason why the Grimes court does not give great atten-
tion to its statement that the Nuremberg Code is part of the law of nations
is due to the definition of customary international law, or the "law of
nations." Customary international law has been defined as "founded on
common consent as well as the common sense of the world.' 28 Similarly,
Blackstone stated that: "the law of nations is a system of rules ... estab-
lished by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the word"
and "all people."'1 9 The Nuremberg Code seemingly falls under Black-
stone's definition because it appears to have been formed by the common
sense of the world and, as discussed above, United States courts have even
called it "part of the law of humanity."' 130
Two requirements-state practice and opinio juris-must be fulfilled
before anything can be considered customary international law.'31 There
is no international body that makes the determination of whether or not
something is customary international law, the United Nations Interna-
tional Court of Justice may declare that a norm is customary international
law if the case it addresses goes to that issue, 13 2 but it does not publish a
declaration of what is and is not customary international law. On the
domestic level, courts can declare customary international law norms.' 33
126. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835; Trials II, supra note 31, at 181-82; ANNAS FT. AL.,
supra note 31, at 21. For the proposition that the Nuremberg Code, as well as other
international codes on human experimentation, should be customary international law,
see David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations, Interna-
tional Law, and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in Developing
Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 326 (2001)
127. See Palmer, supra note 12, at 29. Grimes is an example of this in that it rests the
proposition that the Nuremberg Code is customary international law based on a citation
to the works of George Annas and other scholars. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835.
See Palmer, supra note 12, at 29
128. See id.
129. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 1.
130. See Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796.
131. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by the, from a sense of legal obligation." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW §.102(2) and comment (1996).
132. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 3.
133. Courts in the United States have a long history of recognizing customary inter-
national law:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination . . . For this pur-
pose, where there is no treaty controlling and no controlling executive or legisla-
tive act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commen-
tators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are
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The Nuremberg Code fulfills both narrow and expansive definitions of
the opinio juris component of customary international law. Opiniojuris is
the subjective element, or "pattern of legal expectation"'13 4 of customary
international law. A debate exists between scholars concerning whose
expectations this subjective element rests upon. The more conventional
view is that it derives from the state's feeling that it is obligated. 1 35 How-
ever, calling that view a "false myth perpetrated in early twentieth century,"
scholars like Jordan Paust argue that "the subjective element of customary
international law is to be gathered from patterns of generally shared legal
expectation among humankind, not merely among State elites." 1 3 6 Paust
argues that no other referent, including the legal actions of states or their
published laws would be realistic because "all human beings recognizably
participate in such a process of acceptance and the shaping of attitudes
whether or not such participation is actually recognized by each individ-
ual." 13 7 This grounding in the expectations of humanity can thus provide
customary international law with a real authority and strength, often mak-
ing it directly authoritative in particular social contexts. 138
Paust's definition makes evaluating the presence of the Nuremberg
Code's opinio juris almost unnecessary. It is clear that individuals believe
they have a right to be free from involuntary and insufficiently informed
medical human experimentation. 1 39 The right to personal autonomy is an
essential aspect of basic human rights. 140 However, the Nuremberg Code
meets both Paust's and the conventional definitions of opinio juris.
In courts, opinio juris can develop in an evolutionary process, thus
customary international law emerges; the Nuremberg Code follows this
pattern of evolution. Although the Nuremberg Code was not cited by a
court until 1973, it immediately rooted itself in the country's administra-
tive law via the National Institute of Health and the Defense Department.
Examples of this, including that the Department of Defense took as a given
that the Nuremberg Code would apply in the context of Desert Storm, sup-
port the assertion that it felt obligated to apply it. Even Dr. Beecher's vehe-
ment arguments concerning the Code's inapplicability support the
assertion that it would otherwise be applied-particularly when even his
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors con-
cerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is
Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meece, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th
Cir. 1986).
134. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 1.
135. For a good explanation of different approaches to customary international law,
see generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'l L. 757, available at http://www.asil.
org/ajil/roberts.pdf.
136. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 2.
137. See Id.
138. See Id. at 62-63.
139. See Gelsinger, supra note 68.
140. The Nuremberg Code was incorporated into the ICCPR.
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arguments support the Code's main ethical principle. 14 1 Further, when
the Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) adopted
guidelines in 1952, they explicitly relied upon the Nuremberg Code.
142
The Nuremberg Code also has a presence in international and domes-
tic law to fulfill the state practice component of customary international
law. The United States looks to treaties and other international agree-
ments, domestic constitutions or legislation, executive orders, declarations,
draft conventions or codes, reports, resolutions or decisions of interna-
tional organizations, even testimony or affidavits as evidence of state prac-
tice. 1 4 3 It is difficult for states to actually know how another state's law
treats certain legal concepts, and practically impossible to perform a
world-wide survey of how states actually apply law to certain factual situa-
tions. However, a weak state practice element does not prevent the forma-
tion of customary international law, 144 because it ultimately rests upon the
practice of all participants in the international legal process. 145 With situ-
ations involving human rights, the analysis often goes to what countries
say rather than what they actually "practice." This is one of the reasons
why, when assessing whether a practice is customary international law,
courts often defer to legal scholarship. ' 46
There is international evidence of Nuremberg Code's influence and
acceptance in international multilateral treaties and world organizations.
The Helsinki Declaration and CISMOS Guidelines were directly influenced
by the Nuremberg Code. 14 7 Outside the specific context of conventions
relating to medicine, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, one of the first and the principal human rights convention, was also
directly influenced by the Nuremberg Code. Its non-derogable Article 7
was directly fashioned from the Nuremberg Code's first principle. 148 Fur-
ther, when drafting this first principle, the ICCPR's drafters rejected argu-
ments that its second sentence was redundant, and chose to retain the
language specifically relating to medical experimentation: "[fi]n particular,
no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation." As of October 10, 2003, one-hundred and fifty states
141. See Beecher, supra note 33, at 1360.
142. "The rigid safeguards observed at the NIH are based on the so-called "ten com-
mandments" of human medical research which were adopted at the Nuremberg War
Crimes trials after the atrocities performed by the Nazi doctors had been exposed." Id at
185.
143. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 34.
144. See id. at 4.
145. See id. at 3.
146. See Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
147. See Moreno, supra note 96, at 351; Annas, supra note 61 (discussing the hostility
physician-researchers and scientific researchers had toward the Nuremberg Code, and
how this hostility fueled the promulgation of the Helsinki Declaration and the CIOMS
Guidelines); King, supra note 111, at 179-84..
148. "No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation." See INTERNATIONAi Btu- OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 36
(Paul Williams, ed. 1981), available at http://vww.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/docs/iccpr/cnl-
e.shtml. The ICCPR, forms part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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were party to the declaration, and thus bound to follow the ICCPR's
edicts. '
4 9
D. Applying the Code in Domestic Courts 150
The Grimes Court's willingness to evoke international law in a domestic
case to fill a lacuna in both state and federal regulations is striking. 15 1
Courts rarely evoke international law in cases with purely domestic con-
tacts-and even more rarely evoke it in the face of international and state
regulations. 152 Even if the Nuremberg Code is deemed customary interna-
tional law, additional complications exist with respect to the factual situa-
tion in Grimes. Traditionally, customary international law, or the "law of
nations" applied only to states or people acting under the color of state
authority. Thus, a question of the applicability of customary international
law to American researchers arises. Further the law of nations is consid-
ered federal common law, thus a question arises as to whether the Grimes
court, as a state court, correctly applied federal law to the situation in
Grimes. 153
International law is part of American jurisprudence, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction whenever questions of right depending upon it are presented for
149. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Status of
the Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (Oct. 10, 2003) (presenting a statistical table and list of
the countries party to agreements such as the ICCPR and ESCHR).
150. For a general discussion of the place of customary international law in domestic
courts, see PAUST, supra note 122, at 19; Eric George Reeves, Note, United States v. Javino:
Reconsidering the Relationship of Customary International Law to Domestic Law, 50 WASH.
& LEE. L. REv. 877 (1993).
151. In her dissenting opinion in Stanley, justice O'Connor suggested that the Nurem-
berg Code could be used in this capacity. See U.S. v. Stanley 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(O'Connor, j., dissenting).
152. Most cases attempting to use international law in a domestic context involve
death penalty litigation, see cases cited supra note 39.
153. The question central to this debate is: "To what extent is international law part
of national law?" Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
III HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (favoring the existing rule of treating international law as
federal law) with Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARVARD L. REV. 815 (1997)
(arguing that customary international law should not have the status of federal law, in
the absence of authorization y the federal political branches). See Gerald L. Neuman,
Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley
& Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,
Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 463, 528-29 (1997); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1569 (1984); see, e.g., Symposium: Foreign Affairs Law at
the End of the Century, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999). Compare Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. RE'V. 799 (1995) (arguing for a
broad interpretation of the treaty power whereby both the House and the Senate may
conclude congressional-executive agreements as treaties with a mere majority) with Law-
rence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (arguing for a narrower
view of the sources of proper treaty-making authority).
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their determination.1 54 Customary international law has an explicit basis
in Article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution. There are also several
other constitutional basis, including several of the amendments (especially
the Ninth Amendment), that have as one of their purposes the object to
serve human rights reflected in customary international law.1 55 Although
scholars have argued that that state courts can apply customary interna-
tional law in the same manner that they apply common law, a more
accepted view is that international law should be determined or made by
federal courts as though it were federal law, and their view of it should
bind state courts. 156 In fact, it is practically impossible to find an instance
where a court explicitly relied only on customary international law in a
case between domestic litigants in any context. 157
Paust asserts: "[a]lthough not widely understood, the judicial power to
identify, clarify and apply customary international law in cases otherwise
proper before the courts has a constitutional basis in Article II, section 2,
clause 1 because the 'Laws of the United States' include the "law of
nations."'1 8 The Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States supports this argument; namely that customary international
law is federal substantive law and the supreme law of the land without
regard to jurisdictional competency issues.15 9
154. See Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
155. See PAUST, supra note 122, at 5. This interpretive debate is associated with other
related interpretative questions, namely, related questions about the role of non-execu-
tive political actors in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1998); see also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (deny-
ing states the power to make their own international human rights policy); Lori F.
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-
Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 532 (1991) (on the interpretation and
effect of non self-executing declarations).
156. The latter view would allow appeals to the Supreme Court as involving a federal
question thus giving the Supreme Court a chance to establish a nation-wide rule. See
Annas, supra note 24 at 8. The Supreme Court has rarely faced human experimentation
cases. But see U.S. v. Stanley 483 U.S. 669 (1987). Note that due to the involvement of
the U.S. military in Stanley, it is not a true indication of how the Court might react to a
case involving lay persons, such as Grimes.
157. Cases involving customary international law often come up when the case
involves a foreign plaintiff bringing a cause of action under the Alien Torts Claim Act. In
the domestic setting, courts have not given much credence to arguments that interna-
tional law should apply. Defendants often attempt to invoke customary international
law to argue against the application of the death penalty. Courts in the United States
have found that prohibitions against the death penalty have not risen to the status of
customary international law and have not accepted arguments that customary interna-
tional law forbids that application of the death penalty. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 290, 294 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (citing Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647,
766-67 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). For an extended discussion of the status of the death pen-
alty as customary international law, see Buell v. Mitchell 274 F.3d 337, 374-76 (Ohio
2001). For a suggestion on the application of customary international law with respect
to juveniles receiving the death penalty, see, for example, Servin v. State 32 P.3d 1277
(Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring).
158. See PAUsT, supra note 122, at 6.
159. See id. at 7.
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Customary international law is directly incorporable, at least for civil
sanction and jurisdictional purposes, and the judiciary has the power to
identify and clarify it. 16 0 Further, because judicial duty and responsibility
are based on the constitution, "a court that refuses for some specious rea-
son to apply international law denies its own validity."' 1 61 Another possi-
bility for the incorporation of customary international law is through the
judiciary's power to take judicial notice. 16 2 Although such outlets for the
adoption of customary law exist, they are rarely exercised. In the context
of human experimentation, the courts are the body most likely to incorpo-
rate customary international law.
Domestic judges ultimately have the discretion as to whether and to
what extent international law will play in their decisions. 16 3 Further, the
Grimes court's strong reliance on legal scholarship concerning the applica-
bility of the Nuremberg Code is under-girded by traditional jurisprudential
treatment of customary international law. 164 The Supreme Court, in
Paquete Habana, stated:
"Works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the sub-
jects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is 16 5
The Grimes court, in relying on experts on the Nuremberg Code, fol-
lowed a traditional route of gleaning customary international law
norms. 166 It is clear that the Grimes court correctly exercised its discretion
by employing customary international law in a limited way-in the duty
analysis of a tort case.
As some advocates of the Nuremberg Code argue that the courts of
individual countries including the United States, have "consistently proven
incapable of either punishing those engaged in unlawful and unethical
experimentation or compensating the victims of such experimentation. 167
Although the Grimes court's method of empowering the Nuremberg Code
as customary international law might not be as provocative as some
others, 168 it at least invites the real possibility of providing a forum for
160. See id.
161. See id. at 8.
162. See id. at 89.
163. See Reeves, supra note 149 at 891.
164. See Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
165. See id.
166. See Grimes at 835.
167. See Annas & Grodin, supra note 6 at 312.
168. M.C. Bassiouni's proposed International Covenant on Human Experimentation,
and the formation of an international tribunal with civil and criminal powers to adjudi-
cate cases involving both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research. Id. at 311;see M.
Cheriff Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law
and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J.
CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1641 (1981). Bassiouni's proposed covenant was
rejected by the United Nations, seeGeorge J. Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality,
and Other Millennial Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Human Engineer-
Vol. 36
2003 Promising Protection Through Internationally Derived Duties 407
cases involving human experimentation while allowing domestic jurisdic-
tions to retain control over medical experimentation. 16 9 Further, employ-
ing customary international law-can be faster, easier and less expensive
than more radical proposals such as international medical tribunals.170
IV. Using the Nuremberg Code to Protect Subjects Outside of U.S.
Borders
Researchers often support their exploitation of subject-groups with utilita-
rian arguments. As explained above, Nazi doctors in the Medical Case
made similar arguments. American researchers are now expanding this
trend through their international research endeavors.' 7' As evidenced
through the cases above, even the United States' regulations, which are
some of the most stringent regulations regarding regulations on human
experimentation in the world, fall short.
The international community has been unsuccessful in ratifying an
international covenant pertaining specifically to human experimenta-
tion.17 2 Further, if ratified, many countries like the United States do not
directly incorporate international instruments into domestic law. 173 If the
international community could create international regulations on human
experimentation, it would not guarantee the protections to the world's
populations. Customary international law can help fill this gap because,
excepting conscious objectors, it applies universally without respect to
whether or not a country is a signatory of or party to a convention.
The problem of vulnerable populations extends beyond the borders of
the United States as researchers seek places to experiment that have lax
ing, 49 EMORY LJ. 753. An earlier, narrower, proposal by Professor M. Cheriff Bassiouni
one of the prime movers behind the International Criminal Court, for a criminal Cove-
nant on Human Experimentation, was rejected in 1981, apparently because of the oppo-
sition of the international pharmaceutical industry. See also Annas, supra note 61 at
135-37 e); Sharon Perley et al., The Nureniberg Code: An International Overview, in NAZi
DOCTORS, supra note 6, at 149-73; Annas & Grodin, supra note 6, at 313.
169. See discussion infra Section IV, and accompanying notes; see also cases and
sources cited supra note 40 and accompanying text l(discussing the use of the ATCA to
provide a forum for these cases).
170. For an example of these more radical proposals, see sources cited, supra note
167 and accompanying text; see also, Annas & Grodin, supra note 106, at 118-20 (dub-
bing this proposal a "Permanent Nuremberg" and noting that although medicine and
law are often at odds, that they have a common agenda in the field of human rights and
health).
171. See Keith Epstein and Bill Sloat, U.S. Medical Researchers Flott Rules Around the
Word, PLAIN DEALERS (Nov. 8, 1998) at Al; Todres, supra note 45 at 750; discussion infra
section 111, part C; see also King, supra note 111, at 184 (noting that the current situation
is unacceptable, because despite the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code the interna-
tional community continues to lack an effective legal regieme that defines the rights of
subjects and corresponding duties of researchers)
172. See Bassiouni et al., supra note 167 at 1641. Bassiouni's proposed covenant was
rejected by the United Nations. Annas, The Man on the Moon, supra note 167 at 753; see
also Annas, Changing Landscape supra note 61, at 135-37; Perley et al., supra note 167 at
149, 149-73
173. CfJordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INl'i L.760 (1988); PAUST,
supra note 122, at 6, 51.
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regulations, and are less expensive than the United States. Nigerian fami-
lies recently filed a lawsuit in a New York federal court alleging that Pfizer,
the world's largest drug manufacturer, violated international law by experi-
menting on their children. 174 They contend that Pfizer violated the Nurem-
berg Code, U.N. human rights standards and other ethical guidelines by
using their children as "human guinea pigs" in clinical trials for the antibi-
otic known as Trovan. 175 Plaintiffs contend that during a 1996 meningitis
epidemic, Pfizer used their children as subjects without their knowledge or
consent-and failed to inform them that they could refuse the experimental
treatment and receive more conventional treatments at the same sites free
of charge. 1
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The district court summarily dismissed their case on the grounds of
forum non conveniens. 177 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated
their case on October 8, 2003. Applying a "clear abuse of discretion" stan-
dard, the court of appeals found that the law was not settled as to whether
forum non conveniens should be granted when an adequate forum does not
exist elsewhere-particularly if the plaintiff could prove that basic justice
could not be obtained therein. 78
The Second Circuit's reinstatement of their case opens the possibility
for the plaintiffs' case to move forward towards adjudication. The weighti-
est challenge facing these families is to establish that the researchers owed
them a duty of care, and thus violated the law of nations. t 79 Thus, if fed-
eral courts adopt and bolster the use of the Nuremberg Code, it will enable
these plaintiffs to more easily argue that their case should go to a jury for
consideration.' 80 The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law, section
702, sets out the categories that courts have used to hold individuals liable
for violations of international law regardless of state authority or color of
law."1 These claims include: genocide, slavery, murder, torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention,
174. See Joe Stephens, Suit Accuses Pfizer of Rights Violations, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2001.
175. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 2002 WL 31082956, at *6, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002).
176. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer 2003 WL 22317923 at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2003); see, e.g.,
Dawn Joyce Miller, Comment, Research and Accountability: The Need for Uniform Regula-
tion of International Pharmaceutical Drug Testing 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 197 (2001) (when
researchers from the Unites States and Europe perform research in developing nations,
they are largely free from such research limitations of their home countries); Todres,
supra note 45, at 750 (arguing that there may be sufficient international agreement on
medical experimentation to demonstrate existence of custom).
177. Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §327 (2003), courts can dismiss a case as inconvenient after
balancing several factors including the burden on New York courts, the potential hard-
ship on the defendant, the availability of an alternative forum, the situs of the transac-
tion at issue, the residence of the parties, location of witnesses and evidence and the
substantive law governing the dispute. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.
2d 474, 479 (N.Y. 1984); Blueye Navigation, Inc. v. Den Norske Bank, 658 N.Y. S.2d 9,
10 (1st Dep't 1997).
178. See Abdullahi, 2003 WL 22317923 at *7.
179. See id. at 766-67.
180. See Todres, supra note 45, at 767
181. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (1999).
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systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent patterns of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights. In the Medical Case,
experimentations were characterized as falling under the category of inhu-
man or degrading punishment.
Assuming the case survived procedural and choice of law grounds,
researchers might attempt to use cultural relativist claims regarding their
subjects' informed consent. Cultural relativism basically espouses the
belief that morals develop out of culture,' 8 2 therefore morals vary from
country to country, but also from time period to time period. Cultural
relativists would argue that it should be impermissible to insist that princi-
pals not based on a particular country's culture be implemented, such as
informed consent. Thus, a possible cultural relativist claim here would be
that the subjects' cultural norms mandated less than full disclosure.'8 3
However, this relativist claim is clearly disproved by the Abdullahi plaintiffs'
pleadings and efforts to gain relief.18 4
Beyond cultural relativist claims, researchers might also argue that full
disclosure would have created a "chilling effect" on research efforts there-
fore impeding potentially life-saving research. 18 5 Further they could claim
that they made complete disclosure and consent was given, but that they
were unable to prevent communication problems that affected the subjects'
full understanding. 1
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The Nuremberg Code has the power to block these arguments because
it was specifically designed to subvert similar utilitarian arguments
espoused by Nazi Doctors. 18 7 In other words, the Nuremberg Code's
requirements of informed consent are absolute-they do not allow room for
either cultural relativist or utilitarian arguments. 188
The tragedy is that some parents may be compelled to give their con-
sent irregardless of the risks involved' 89 -there are people necessitous
182. See generally, Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the
Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527; Guyora
Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural hnperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BuFALO
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999); Ryan, supra note 89 at 885-913 (discussing research
regulation for dealing with child-subject in the United States, the European Union and
Japan)
183. See George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and
Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED.
357, 357-94 (1994).
184. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 2003 WL 22317923 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2003), Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. Sep't. 17, 2002); see also, Ryan supra note 89, at
912-34. (discussing the problems of globalization of the pharmaceutical industry and
research experiments on children in that context).
185. See Todres, supra note 45, at 767-68.
186. See Annas & Grodin, supra note 6, at 312.
187. See Ruth Macklin, Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in NA7_i DOCTORS supra
note 6, at 240, 240-57.
188. See id.
189. In the Nigerian case the plaintiffs claim that this is not the case, because more
conventional medicines were available on site that the researchers failed to inform them
of-plaintiffs argue that they would have employed the more conventional medicines and
thus prevented the effects the experimentation, such as their claims that their children
were harmed by "low-dosing." See Abdullah, 2003 WL 22317923 at *1-2. For a further
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enough to choose the offered "benefits" experiments offer over their risks
in order to get treatment for their children-which is a decision, that no
one should be forced to make.' 90 Poor populations without access to
medicine might become the willing subjects of human experiment in
attempt to survive bacterial outbreaks, AIDS and other diseases, illnesses,
and infections. Abuse of their willingness to participate-or perhaps even
allowing them to participate-by denying them full disclosure that meets
the Nuremberg Code's standard of informed consent could have detrimen-
tal effects for both the subjects and their society."9 1
Initially, the subjects will feel harmed, seek recovery and refuse to par-
ticipate in further research. However, more serious ramifications can
result. These situations threaten to create mistrust of modern medicine by
both the subjects and their society, which in turn could shatter the trust
that the people have for individual physicians and caregivers.1 9 2 This
could prompt them to resort to self-help, alternative solutions, refuse treat-
ment, or fail to seek treatment-all of which could be detrimental to their
health. 193 Thus, the use of the Nuremberg Code as customary interna-
tional law that Grimes suggests may protect American subjects of human
experimentation, as well as potential human subjects throughout the
world. 194
Conclusion
As international law grows in volume and legitimacy, domestic courts, may
become more willing to adopt its principles to fill holes and vagaries in
discussion, and proposal to add a Protocol to the ICCPR to protect international subjects
of research experimentation, see King, supra note 111, at 199-206 (specifically discuss-
ing populations subject to "situational coercion" and "in need").
190. The most notorious violations of research projects in the United States involved
indigents or poor. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio
1995); TUSKEGEE STUDY supra note 10; JONES, supra note 10; HUMAN RADIATION, supra
note 10.
191. See Beecher, supra note 33 at 1360. Similar arguments have been made that
prisoners can never give their fully informed consent. Further they are often induced to
participate by promises of early parole or other like considerations. See Garnett, supra
note 80, at 455, 477-81 (1996) (arguing that a prisoner's capacity to choose goes to the
heart of the Nuremberg Code).
192. See Todres, supra note 45, at 766-67. Arguments are made that this is what has
happened in African American communities in the United States due to historical
abuses by the medical community. See, e.g., Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation
and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American Per-
ceptive on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 235 (1996); CBCF, Distrust of
Medical Community May Make Recruitment of Black Volunteers for AIDS Vaccine Testing
Difficult, (March 24, 2003), available at http://www.cbcfhealth.org/content/contentID/
1522.
193. See id. at 767.
194. Ostensibly, foreign plaintiffs would be able to sue other foreign parties in United
States courts through the ATCA if the Nuremberg Code was considered customary inter-
national law by United States courts. This would ensure that plaintiffs would at least
have one forum open to them. Although this is a less radical remedythan others, it
would provide plaintiffs with a true chance of recovery. Compare Annas & Grodin, supra
note 6, at 312-13.
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domestic law, particularly where international law affords more protec-
tions than domestic law. The Grimes court rightly invoked the Nuremberg
Code-even if its protections are ultimately imperfect.'
9 5
By exploring why the Nuremberg Code was unquestioningly used by
the Grimes court this note hoped to strengthen the Grimes court's argu-
ments. Giving the Nuremberg Code the full strength of customary interna-
tional law will help protect subjects when researchers fail to adequately
provide for their humanity. The ultimate point is not that experimentation
on humans should be halted or even slowed-it is that as human beings
participants in research should be accorded the dignity they are deserving
of as human beings.
195. To "protect and shield humans everywhere from nonconsensual research, we
must implement protections." Id. at 313.
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Appendix 1: The Nuremberg Code
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.
This means that the person involved should have the legal capac-
ity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise the free
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, overreaching to other ulterior form of constraint or coer-
cion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the ele-
ments of the subject matter involved as to enable him to male and
understanding and enlightened decision by the experimental subject their
should be made known to him the nature, duration and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health pr person which may possibly come form his participation
in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experi-
ment, it is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to
another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the dis-
ease or other problem under study that anticipated results will justify the
performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical ad mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except perhaps,
in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
6. The degree of risk o be taken should never exceed that deter-
mined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.
7. Proper preparations would be made and adequate facilities pro-
vided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities
of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically quali-
fied persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required
though all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the
experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should
be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physi-
cal or mental state where continuation of the experimentation seems to
him to be impossible.
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10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of good faith, superior skill, and careful
judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.

